From alijawad1 at gmail.com  Mon Jan 18 16:35:52 2010
From: alijawad1 at gmail.com (Ali Jawad)
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 19:35:52 +0300
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
Message-ID: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>

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Hi All
As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious
workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he
will execute.

sudo iftop

Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following promtp

command >

At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell. He can
also execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of using sudo
initially was giving the user iftop access. However the user ends up with
total root access.

Please comment.

Regards

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi All<br>As you all know a non root user can not run ifto=
p. So the most obvious workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular=
 user sudo access he will execute.<br><br>sudo iftop<br><br>Once he is insi=
de iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following promtp<br>

<br>command &gt;<br><br>At this point a user can execute su, and he will ge=
t a root shell. He can also execute any command in privileged mode. The ide=
a of using sudo initially was giving the user iftop access. However the use=
r ends up with total root access.<br>

<br>Please comment.<br><br>Regards<br></div>

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From alijawad1 at gmail.com  Mon Jan 18 17:26:08 2010
From: alijawad1 at gmail.com (Ali Jawad)
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 20:26:08 +0300
Subject: [Iftop-users] Re: Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <fb6f4c5d1001180926s5e716cc1x91e43586f9d4a865@mail.gmail.com>

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> Hi All
> As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious
> workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he
> will execute.
>
> sudo iftop
>
> Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following promtp
>
> command >
>
> At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell. He can
> also execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of using sudo
> initially was giving the user iftop access. However the user ends up with
> total root access.
>
> Please comment.
>
> Regards
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt =
0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi All<br>As you all know a=
 non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious workaround is to use =
sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he will execute.<br>

<br>sudo iftop<br><br>Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get=
 the following promtp<br>
<br>command &gt;<br><br>At this point a user can execute su, and he will ge=
t a root shell. He can also execute any command in privileged mode. The ide=
a of using sudo initially was giving the user iftop access. However the use=
r ends up with total root access.<br>


<br>Please comment.<br><br>Regards<br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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From pdw at ex-parrot.com  Mon Jan 18 18:24:43 2010
From: pdw at ex-parrot.com (Paul Warren)
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 18:24:43 +0000
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <69CCF86C-BA04-4F03-8994-A3B4C723C389@ex-parrot.com>

Ali,

On 18 Jan 2010, at 16:35, Ali Jawad wrote:

> As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most  
> obvious workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user  
> sudo access he will execute.
>
> sudo iftop
>
> Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following  
> promtp
>
> command >

I have to say, I'd completely forgotten that that feature existed!

> At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell.  
> He can also execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of  
> using sudo initially was giving the user iftop access. However the  
> user ends up with total root access.

Indeed.

There are two answers to this.  The first is that although this  
provides the user with a very direct and simple way of getting a  
shell, I would not warrant that there are not bugs in either iftop or  
any of it's library dependencies that can be exploited to give  
privilege escalation.  This applies to just about any non-trivial  
program that you may wish to make available via sudo.

The second answer is that there's a compile-time option to disable  
this functionality (which I'd also forgotten about, but the change log  
claims it was introduced in 0.17).

I can't remember exactly how to use it, but something like:

	export CFLAGS=-DNO_SYSTEM

then rebuilding may do what you want.

Paul



From alijawad1 at gmail.com  Mon Jan 18 18:34:27 2010
From: alijawad1 at gmail.com (Ali Jawad)
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 21:34:27 +0300
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <69CCF86C-BA04-4F03-8994-A3B4C723C389@ex-parrot.com>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
 <69CCF86C-BA04-4F03-8994-A3B4C723C389@ex-parrot.com>
Message-ID: <fb6f4c5d1001181034m72b34bffq29a8783b324ffd3b@mail.gmail.com>

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Hi Paul
I discovered it by accident, and well you are right about bugs for privilege
escalation. But this is not a bug, it is a feature that can be used for
privilege escalation.
I did google around and as you said it is barely known. I can see the
benefits of the feature, to see live changes in traffic shapping by
executing different traffic shapping scripts through the commad prompts and
seeing the results.

For my own needs, I will remove the deb package and recompile from source.

Regards

On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Paul Warren <pdw@ex-parrot.com> wrote:

> Ali,
>
>
> On 18 Jan 2010, at 16:35, Ali Jawad wrote:
>
>  As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious
>> workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he
>> will execute.
>>
>> sudo iftop
>>
>> Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following promtp
>>
>> command >
>>
>
> I have to say, I'd completely forgotten that that feature existed!
>
>
>  At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell. He can
>> also execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of using sudo
>> initially was giving the user iftop access. However the user ends up with
>> total root access.
>>
>
> Indeed.
>
> There are two answers to this.  The first is that although this provides
> the user with a very direct and simple way of getting a shell, I would not
> warrant that there are not bugs in either iftop or any of it's library
> dependencies that can be exploited to give privilege escalation.  This
> applies to just about any non-trivial program that you may wish to make
> available via sudo.
>
> The second answer is that there's a compile-time option to disable this
> functionality (which I'd also forgotten about, but the change log claims it
> was introduced in 0.17).
>
> I can't remember exactly how to use it, but something like:
>
>        export CFLAGS=-DNO_SYSTEM
>
> then rebuilding may do what you want.
>
> Paul
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Paul<br>I discovered it by accident, and well you are r=
ight about bugs for privilege escalation. But this is not a bug, it is a fe=
ature that can be used for privilege escalation.<br>I did google around and=
 as you said it is barely known. I can see the benefits of the feature, to =
see live changes in traffic shapping by executing different traffic shappin=
g scripts through the commad prompts and seeing the results.<br>

<br>For my own needs, I will remove the deb package and recompile from sour=
ce.<br><br>Regards<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 a=
t 9:24 PM, Paul Warren <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pdw@ex-parro=
t.com">pdw@ex-parrot.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">Ali,<div class=3D=
"im"><br>
<br>
On 18 Jan 2010, at 16:35, Ali Jawad wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious work=
around is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he will e=
xecute.<br>
<br>
sudo iftop<br>
<br>
Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following promtp<=
br>
<br>
command &gt;<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
I have to say, I&#39;d completely forgotten that that feature existed!<div =
class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell. He can a=
lso execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of using sudo initiall=
y was giving the user iftop access. However the user ends up with total roo=
t access.<br>


</blockquote>
<br></div>
Indeed.<br>
<br>
There are two answers to this. =A0The first is that although this provides =
the user with a very direct and simple way of getting a shell, I would not =
warrant that there are not bugs in either iftop or any of it&#39;s library =
dependencies that can be exploited to give privilege escalation. =A0This ap=
plies to just about any non-trivial program that you may wish to make avail=
able via sudo.<br>


<br>
The second answer is that there&#39;s a compile-time option to disable this=
 functionality (which I&#39;d also forgotten about, but the change log clai=
ms it was introduced in 0.17).<br>
<br>
I can&#39;t remember exactly how to use it, but something like:<br>
<br>
 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0export CFLAGS=3D-DNO_SYSTEM<br>
<br>
then rebuilding may do what you want.<br><font color=3D"#888888">
<br>
Paul<br>
<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From alijawad1 at gmail.com  Mon Jan 18 22:56:09 2010
From: alijawad1 at gmail.com (Ali Jawad)
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2010 01:56:09 +0300
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <fb6f4c5d1001181034m72b34bffq29a8783b324ffd3b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
 <69CCF86C-BA04-4F03-8994-A3B4C723C389@ex-parrot.com> <fb6f4c5d1001181034m72b34bffq29a8783b324ffd3b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <fb6f4c5d1001181456k6fe64774gdf35b514db135d4d@mail.gmail.com>

--000e0cd1d6ea8626ca047d7843cd
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Just to be fair, even text editor do allow for such functionality. The
simplest way to deal with this is to make use of the noexec functionality of
sudo. It does prevent a process from spawning a shell.

On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 9:34 PM, Ali Jawad <alijawad1@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Paul
> I discovered it by accident, and well you are right about bugs for
> privilege escalation. But this is not a bug, it is a feature that can be
> used for privilege escalation.
> I did google around and as you said it is barely known. I can see the
> benefits of the feature, to see live changes in traffic shapping by
> executing different traffic shapping scripts through the commad prompts and
> seeing the results.
>
> For my own needs, I will remove the deb package and recompile from source.
>
> Regards
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Paul Warren <pdw@ex-parrot.com> wrote:
>
>> Ali,
>>
>>
>> On 18 Jan 2010, at 16:35, Ali Jawad wrote:
>>
>>  As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious
>>> workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he
>>> will execute.
>>>
>>> sudo iftop
>>>
>>> Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following
>>> promtp
>>>
>>> command >
>>>
>>
>> I have to say, I'd completely forgotten that that feature existed!
>>
>>
>>  At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell. He can
>>> also execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of using sudo
>>> initially was giving the user iftop access. However the user ends up with
>>> total root access.
>>>
>>
>> Indeed.
>>
>> There are two answers to this.  The first is that although this provides
>> the user with a very direct and simple way of getting a shell, I would not
>> warrant that there are not bugs in either iftop or any of it's library
>> dependencies that can be exploited to give privilege escalation.  This
>> applies to just about any non-trivial program that you may wish to make
>> available via sudo.
>>
>> The second answer is that there's a compile-time option to disable this
>> functionality (which I'd also forgotten about, but the change log claims it
>> was introduced in 0.17).
>>
>> I can't remember exactly how to use it, but something like:
>>
>>        export CFLAGS=-DNO_SYSTEM
>>
>> then rebuilding may do what you want.
>>
>> Paul
>>
>>
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Just to be fair, even text editor do allow for such functi=
onality. The simplest way to deal with this is to make use of the noexec fu=
nctionality of sudo. It does prevent a process from spawning a shell.<br><b=
r>

<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 9:34 PM, Ali Jawad <span=
 dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:alijawad1@gmail.com">alijawad1@gmail.com=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border=
-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-lef=
t: 1ex;">

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Paul<br>I discovered it by accident, and well you are r=
ight about bugs for privilege escalation. But this is not a bug, it is a fe=
ature that can be used for privilege escalation.<br>I did google around and=
 as you said it is barely known. I can see the benefits of the feature, to =
see live changes in traffic shapping by executing different traffic shappin=
g scripts through the commad prompts and seeing the results.<br>


<br>For my own needs, I will remove the deb package and recompile from sour=
ce.<br><br>Regards<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Paul Warren <span dir=3D"ltr">=
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pdw@ex-parrot.com" target=3D"_blank">pdw@ex-parrot.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">Ali,<div><br>
<br>
On 18 Jan 2010, at 16:35, Ali Jawad wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most obvious work=
around is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular user sudo access he will e=
xecute.<br>
<br>
sudo iftop<br>
<br>
Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the following promtp<=
br>
<br>
command &gt;<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
I have to say, I&#39;d completely forgotten that that feature existed!<div>=
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell. He can a=
lso execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of using sudo initiall=
y was giving the user iftop access. However the user ends up with total roo=
t access.<br>



</blockquote>
<br></div>
Indeed.<br>
<br>
There are two answers to this. =A0The first is that although this provides =
the user with a very direct and simple way of getting a shell, I would not =
warrant that there are not bugs in either iftop or any of it&#39;s library =
dependencies that can be exploited to give privilege escalation. =A0This ap=
plies to just about any non-trivial program that you may wish to make avail=
able via sudo.<br>



<br>
The second answer is that there&#39;s a compile-time option to disable this=
 functionality (which I&#39;d also forgotten about, but the change log clai=
ms it was introduced in 0.17).<br>
<br>
I can&#39;t remember exactly how to use it, but something like:<br>
<br>
 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0export CFLAGS=3D-DNO_SYSTEM<br>
<br>
then rebuilding may do what you want.<br><font color=3D"#888888">
<br>
Paul<br>
<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--000e0cd1d6ea8626ca047d7843cd--


From tolimar at debian.org  Tue Jan 19 12:52:30 2010
From: tolimar at debian.org (Alexander Reichle-Schmehl)
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2010 13:52:30 +0100
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <69CCF86C-BA04-4F03-8994-A3B4C723C389@ex-parrot.com>
Message-ID: <20100119125230.GO9016@melusine.alphascorpii.net>

Hi!


>> At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root shell.  
>> He can also execute any command in privileged mode. The idea of  
>> using sudo initially was giving the user iftop access. However the  
>> user ends up with total root access.

> Indeed.
> [..]
> The second answer is that there's a compile-time option to disable  
> this functionality (which I'd also forgotten about, but the change log  
> claims it was introduced in 0.17).
>
> I can't remember exactly how to use it, but something like:
>
>	export CFLAGS=-DNO_SYSTEM
>
> then rebuilding may do what you want.

There ist still an other way (which I just learned myself):  Properly
configre your sudoers.

sudo can (on supported platforms) prevent subshells (or any subcommands)
to be run.

E.g. the following:

are ALL=NOEXEC: /usr/sbin/iftop

Allows the user "are" to execute iftop, but prevents him from executing
a subshell. iftop will then display a "permission denied" error.


More details are in the sudo manpage under the topic "REVENTING SHELL
ESCAPES".


Best regards,
  Alexander, wondering if the Debian packages should this disable this
feature completly or just document and recommend the NOEXEC trick.


From shigorin at gmail.com  Wed Jan 20 14:07:23 2010
From: shigorin at gmail.com (Michael Shigorin)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 16:07:23 +0200
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100120140723.GN19857@osdn.org.ua>

On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 07:35:52PM +0300, Ali Jawad wrote:
> As you all know a non root user can not run iftop. So the most
> obvious workaround is to use sudo. Now if you give a regular
> user sudo access he will execute.
> 
> sudo iftop
> 
> Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the
> following promtp
> 
> command >
> 
> At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root
> shell. He can also execute any command in privileged mode. The
> idea of using sudo initially was giving the user iftop access.
> However the user ends up with total root access.
> Please comment.

I'd make availability of "!" depend on explicit commandline
switch -- IIRC comparing getuid()/geteuid() won't help much,
and for a program intended to run with elevated privileges
having means to start another program is something worth
reconsidering.

2 ldv: what would you say?

-- 
 ---- WBR, Michael Shigorin <mike@altlinux.ru>
  ------ Linux.Kiev http://www.linux.kiev.ua/


From shigorin at gmail.com  Wed Jan 20 15:04:27 2010
From: shigorin at gmail.com (Michael Shigorin)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 17:04:27 +0200
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100120150427.GO19857@osdn.org.ua>

On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 07:35:52PM +0300, Ali Jawad wrote:
> Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the
> following promtp
> command >
> At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root
> shell. He can also execute any command in privileged mode.

OTOH I didn't exactly manage to execute anything
with Dmitry Levin's iftop-0.16-alt-droproot.patch
(commit 04f8d2cb0e0e07bd834f49dcb4d49bf07e060d04 in
http://git.altlinux.org/people/ldv/packages/?p=iftop.git)
and pseudouser having his shell and home set to /dev/null:

$ sudo iftop -BP -i eth0
interface: eth0
IP address is: ...
MAC address is: ...
ls /: exited with code 127
echo test: exited with code 127
Press any key....

See also ChangeLog as of 0.17:
* Addition of "NO_SYSTEM" compiler flag to prevent subshell execution

Seems like nice default, er?

In the mean time, I'm pushing ALT Linux package built with 
CFLAGS="-DNO_SYSTEM" just in case, thanks for spotting.

-- 
 ---- WBR, Michael Shigorin <mike@altlinux.ru>
  ------ Linux.Kiev http://www.linux.kiev.ua/


From shigorin at gmail.com  Wed Jan 20 15:21:24 2010
From: shigorin at gmail.com (Michael Shigorin)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 17:21:24 +0200
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <20100120140723.GN19857@osdn.org.ua>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com> <20100120140723.GN19857@osdn.org.ua>
Message-ID: <20100120152124.GP19857@osdn.org.ua>

--JwB53PgKC5A7+0Ej
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline

PreScriptum: Paul, could you please accept changes done here?
http://git.altlinux.org/people/ldv/packages/?p=iftop.git

I'm attaching the full diff between 0.17 and ALT Linux package,
as well as individual patch (which was since updated, see git).

> 2 ldv: what would you say?

---
On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 04:07:23PM +0200, Michael Shigorin wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 07:35:52PM +0300, Ali Jawad wrote:
> > As you all know a non root user can not run iftop.

Unless iftop is installed suid-root.

> > So the most obvious workaround is to use sudo. Now if you
> > give a regular user sudo access he will execute.
> >
> > sudo iftop
> >
> > Once he is inside iftop. He can execute ! he will get the
> > following promtp
> >
> > command >
> >
> > At this point a user can execute su, and he will get a root
> > shell. He can also execute any command in privileged mode. The
> > idea of using sudo initially was giving the user iftop access.
> > However the user ends up with total root access.
> > Please comment.
>
> I'd make availability of "!" depend on explicit commandline
> switch -- IIRC comparing getuid()/geteuid() won't help much,
> and for a program intended to run with elevated privileges
> having means to start another program is something worth
> reconsidering.
>
> 2 ldv: what would you say?

I think that a privileged program shouldn't execute arbitrary user
specified programs unless explicitly configured to allow such insecure
behaviour.

A process can check at startup time whether it is executed:
- suid-root, by comparing results of getuid() and geteuid();
- by sudo, by checking SUDO_USER environment variable.

It is important to do the check at startup time, because process
privileges could be lowered later.


--
ldv
---

-- 
 ---- WBR, Michael Shigorin <mike@altlinux.ru>
  ------ Linux.Kiev http://www.linux.kiev.ua/

--JwB53PgKC5A7+0Ej
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="iftop-0.17-alt3.patch"

 addrs_dlpi.c  |    3 +-
 addrs_ioctl.c |    3 +-
 cfgfile.c     |   12 ++------
 cfgfile.h     |    2 +
 configure.in  |   22 ++++++++++++++
 get_addrs.h   |    7 ++++
 iftop.c       |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 iftop.control |   17 +++++++++++
 iftop.h       |    3 --
 options.c     |   75 +-------------------------------------------------
 options.h     |    3 +-
 ui.c          |   17 +++++------
 12 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)

diff --git a/addrs_dlpi.c b/addrs_dlpi.c
index 188fef8..baa8648 100644
--- a/addrs_dlpi.c
+++ b/addrs_dlpi.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <net/if.h>
 
 #include "dlcommon.h"
+#include "get_addrs.h"
 
 extern char *split_dname(char *device, int *unitp);
 extern char *strncpy2(char *dest, char *src, int n);
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ extern char *strncat2(char *dest, char *src, int n);
  */
 
 int
-get_addrs_dlpi(char *interface, char if_hw_addr[], struct in_addr *if_ip_addr)
+get_addrs_dlpi(char *interface, unsigned char if_hw_addr[], struct in_addr *if_ip_addr)
 {
   int got_hw_addr = 0;
   int got_ip_addr = 0;
diff --git a/addrs_ioctl.c b/addrs_ioctl.c
index 3d58d0d..c98ed6c 100644
--- a/addrs_ioctl.c
+++ b/addrs_ioctl.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #include "iftop.h"
+#include "get_addrs.h"
 
 /*
  * This function identifies the IP address and ethernet address for the requested
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@
  */
 
 int
-get_addrs_ioctl(char *interface, char if_hw_addr[], struct in_addr *if_ip_addr)
+get_addrs_ioctl(char *interface, unsigned char if_hw_addr[], struct in_addr *if_ip_addr)
 {
   int s;
   struct ifreq ifr = {};
diff --git a/cfgfile.c b/cfgfile.c
index 442316c..43f83c9 100644
--- a/cfgfile.c
+++ b/cfgfile.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 
@@ -56,12 +57,12 @@ int config_init() {
     return config != NULL;
 }
 
-/* read_config_file:
+/* read_config:
  * Read a configuration file consisting of key: value tuples, returning a
  * stringmap of the results. Prints errors to stderr, rather than using
  * syslog, since this file is called at program startup. Returns 1 on success
  * or 0 on failure. */
-int read_config_file(const char *f, int whinge) {
+int read_config(const char *f, int whinge) {
     int ret = 0;
     FILE *fp;
     char *line;
@@ -164,7 +165,6 @@ int config_get_int(const char *directive, int *value) {
  * failure, or 0 if no value was found. */
 int config_get_float(const char *directive, float *value) {
     stringmap S;
-    item *I;
     char *s, *t;
 
     if (!value) return -1;
@@ -233,9 +233,3 @@ void config_set_string(const char *directive, const char* s) {
     if (S) stringmap_delete_free(S);
     stringmap_insert(config, directive, item_ptr(xstrdup(s)));
 }
-
-int read_config(char *file, int whinge_on_error) {
-    void* o;
-
-    return read_config_file(file, whinge_on_error);
-}
diff --git a/cfgfile.h b/cfgfile.h
index 38532ad..24baba0 100644
--- a/cfgfile.h
+++ b/cfgfile.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ char *config_get_string(const char *directive);
 int config_get_bool(const char *directive);
 int config_get_int(const char *directive, int *value);
 int config_get_float(const char *directive, float *value);
+void config_set_string(const char *directive, const char* s);
+int config_get_enum(const char *directive, config_enumeration_type *enumeration, int *value);
 int config_init();
 
 
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 12055e0..12795d9 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(iftop, "0.17")
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(IFTOP_VERSION, "$VERSION", [The iftop version number])
 
 dnl Make sure we have a C compiler....
+AC_GNU_SOURCE
 AC_PROG_CC
 AC_HEADER_STDC
 
@@ -69,6 +70,26 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libpcap,
     [libpcap_prefix=$withval],
     [libpcap_prefix=""])
 
+AC_ARG_WITH(user,
+    [  --with-user=USERNAME    Drop privileges by default to USERNAME])
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to drop root privileges by default])
+if test -n "$withval"; then
+    AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(WITH_USER, "$withval", [Drop privileges by default to this username])
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(to \"$withval\")
+else
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(chroot,
+    [  --with-chroot=DIRECTORY When dropping privileges, chroot to DIRECTORY])
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to chroot by default])
+if test -n "$withval"; then
+    AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(WITH_CHROOT, "$withval", [Chroot to this directory when dropping privileges])
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(to \"$withval\")
+else
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+fi
+
 dnl
 dnl Fairly generic checks.
 dnl
@@ -92,6 +113,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(regcomp select strdup strerror strspn)
 
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(log, m)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dlopen, dl)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(gethostbyname, ,
 	[AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname)] )
 
diff --git a/get_addrs.h b/get_addrs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21a942c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/get_addrs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#ifndef GET_ADDRS_H_ /* include guard */
+#define GET_ADDRS_H_
+
+int get_addrs_dlpi(char *interface, unsigned char if_hw_addr[], struct in_addr *if_ip_addr);
+int get_addrs_ioctl(char *interface, unsigned char if_hw_addr[], struct in_addr *if_ip_addr);
+
+#endif /* GET_ADDRS_H_ */
diff --git a/iftop.c b/iftop.c
index 5a7b41e..7e126d4 100644
--- a/iftop.c
+++ b/iftop.c
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
 
 #include "iftop.h"
 #include "addr_hash.h"
@@ -44,6 +48,7 @@
 #include "ethertype.h"
 #include "cfgfile.h"
 #include "ppp.h"
+#include "get_addrs.h"
 
 
 /* ethernet address of interface. */
@@ -477,7 +482,6 @@ char *set_filter_code(const char *filter) {
 void packet_init() {
     char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];
     char *m;
-    int s;
     int i;
     int dlt;
     int result;
@@ -507,7 +511,6 @@ void packet_init() {
     }
     
     //    exit(0);
-    resolver_initialise();
 
     pd = pcap_open_live(options.interface, CAPTURE_LENGTH, options.promiscuous, 1000, errbuf);
     // DEBUG: pd = pcap_open_offline("tcpdump.out", errbuf);
@@ -557,10 +560,69 @@ void packet_loop(void* ptr) {
 }
 
 
+static int droproot (void) {
+#ifdef WITH_USER
+	uid_t uid;
+	gid_t gid;
+
+	if (geteuid())
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((uid = getuid()) == 0) {
+		const char *username = WITH_USER;
+		struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(username);
+
+		if (!pw) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lookup of user \"%s\" failed\n", username);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		gid = pw->pw_gid;
+		uid = pw->pw_uid;
+
+		if (uid == 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "user \"%s\" should not be privileged\n",
+				username);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, gid) != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Failed to initialize supplementary group list: %m\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		endpwent();
+
+#ifdef WITH_CHROOT
+		(void) dlopen("libgcc_s.so.1", RTLD_LAZY);
+
+		const char *chroot_dir = WITH_CHROOT;
+		if (chdir(chroot_dir) < 0 || chroot(".") < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "chroot/chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+				chroot_dir, strerror(errno));
+			return 1;
+		}
+#endif /* WITH_CHROOT */
+
+	} else {
+		gid = getgid();
+	}
+
+	if (setgid(gid) < 0 || setuid(uid) < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "setuid/setgid to %u:%u failed: %s\n",
+			uid, gid, strerror(errno));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+#endif /* WITH_USER */
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* main:
  * Entry point. See usage(). */
 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-    pthread_t thread;
+    int rc;
     struct sigaction sa = {};
 
     /* TODO: tidy this up */
@@ -575,21 +637,27 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     sa.sa_handler = finish;
     sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
 
-    pthread_mutex_init(&tick_mutex, NULL);
-
     packet_init();
 
     init_history();
 
     ui_init();
 
-    pthread_create(&thread, NULL, (void*)&packet_loop, NULL);
+    if ((rc = droproot()) == 0) {
+	pthread_t thread;
+
+	pthread_mutex_init(&tick_mutex, NULL);
+
+	resolver_initialise();
 
-    ui_loop();
+	pthread_create(&thread, NULL, (void*)&packet_loop, NULL);
 
-    pthread_cancel(thread);
+	ui_loop();
+
+	pthread_cancel(thread);
+    }
 
     ui_finish();
     
-    return 0;
+    return rc;
 }
diff --git a/iftop.control b/iftop.control
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b2e0a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/iftop.control
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. /etc/control.d/functions
+
+BINARY=/usr/bin/iftop
+
+new_summary 'Network bandwidth monitor'
+
+new_fmode public 4711 root root
+new_fmode netadmin 4710 root netadmin
+new_fmode restricted 700 root root
+
+new_help public "Any user can execute $BINARY"
+new_help netadmin "Only \"netadmin\" group members can execute $BINARY"
+new_help restricted "Only root can execute $BINARY"
+
+control_fmode "$BINARY" "$*" || exit 1
diff --git a/iftop.h b/iftop.h
index 42947af..b3101c2 100644
--- a/iftop.h
+++ b/iftop.h
@@ -32,8 +32,5 @@ void xfree(void *v);
 void analyse_data(void);
 void ui_init(void);
 
-/* options.c */
-void options_read(int argc, char **argv);
-
 
 #endif /* __IFTOP_H_ */
diff --git a/options.c b/options.c
index 8f385de..32d4106 100644
--- a/options.c
+++ b/options.c
@@ -158,79 +158,6 @@ void options_set_defaults() {
     
 }
 
-static void die(char *msg) {
-    fprintf(stderr, msg);
-    exit(1);
-}
-
-static void set_max_bandwidth(char* arg) {
-    char* units;
-    long long mult = 1;
-    long long value;
-    units = arg + strspn(arg, "0123456789");
-    if(strlen(units) > 1) {
-        die("Invalid units\n");
-    }
-    if(strlen(units) == 1) {
-        if(*units == 'k' || *units == 'K') {
-            mult = 1024;
-        }
-        else if(*units == 'm' || *units == 'M') {
-            mult = 1024 * 1024;
-        }
-        else if(*units == 'g' || *units == 'G') {
-            mult = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
-        }
-    }
-    *units = '\0';
-    if(sscanf(arg, "%lld", &value) != 1) {
-        die("Error reading max bandwidth\n");
-    }
-    options.max_bandwidth = value * mult;
-}
-
-static void set_net_filter(char* arg) {
-    char* mask;
-
-    mask = strchr(arg, '/');
-    if (mask == NULL) {
-        die("Could not parse net/mask\n");
-    }
-    *mask = '\0';
-    mask++;
-    if (inet_aton(arg, &options.netfilternet) == 0)
-        die("Invalid network address\n");
-    /* Accept a netmask like /24 or /255.255.255.0. */
-    if (mask[strspn(mask, "0123456789")] == '\0') {
-        /* Whole string is numeric */
-        int n;
-        n = atoi(mask);
-        if (n > 32) {
-            die("Invalid netmask");
-        }
-        else {
-            if(n == 32) {
-              /* This needs to be special cased, although I don't fully 
-               * understand why -pdw 
-               */
-              options.netfiltermask.s_addr = htonl(0xffffffffl);
-            }
-            else {
-              u_int32_t mm = 0xffffffffl;
-              mm >>= n;
-              options.netfiltermask.s_addr = htonl(~mm);
-            }
-        }
-    } 
-    else if (inet_aton(mask, &options.netfiltermask) == 0) {
-        die("Invalid netmask\n");
-    }
-    options.netfilternet.s_addr = options.netfilternet.s_addr & options.netfiltermask.s_addr;
-
-    options.netfilter = 1;
-
-}
-
 /* usage:
  * Print usage information. */
 static void usage(FILE *fp) {
@@ -481,7 +408,7 @@ int options_config_get_net_filter() {
 }
 
 
-void options_make() {
+void options_make(void) {
     options_config_get_string("interface", &options.interface);
     options_config_get_bool("dns-resolution", &options.dnsresolution);
     options_config_get_bool("port-resolution", &options.portresolution);
diff --git a/options.h b/options.h
index d6b64ea..317d253 100644
--- a/options.h
+++ b/options.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ typedef struct {
 
 
 void options_set_defaults();
-void options_read(int argc, char **argv);
+void options_read_args(int argc, char **argv);
+void options_make(void);
 
 #endif /* __OPTIONS_H_ */
diff --git a/ui.c b/ui.c
index 72ceeb0..c624b55 100644
--- a/ui.c
+++ b/ui.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static void draw_bar_scale(int* y) {
             char s[40], *p;
             int x;
             /* This 1024 vs 1000 stuff is just plain evil */
-            readable_size(i, s, sizeof s, options.log_scale ? 1000 : 1024, 0);
+            readable_size(i, s, sizeof s, options.log_scale ? 1000 : 1024, options.bandwidth_in_bytes);
             p = s + strspn(s, " ");
             x = get_bar_length(i * 8);
             mvaddch(*y + 1, x, ACS_BTEE);
@@ -298,10 +298,6 @@ void draw_line_total(float sent, float recv, int y, int x, option_linedisplay_t
     char buf[10];
     float n;
     switch(linedisplay) {
-        case OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_TWO_LINE:
-          draw_line_total(sent, recv, y, x, OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_ONE_LINE_SENT, bytes);
-          draw_line_total(sent, recv, y+1, x, OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_ONE_LINE_RECV, bytes);
-          break;
         case OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_ONE_LINE_SENT:
           n = sent;
           break;
@@ -311,11 +307,14 @@ void draw_line_total(float sent, float recv, int y, int x, option_linedisplay_t
         case OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_ONE_LINE_BOTH:
           n = recv + sent;
           break;
+        case OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_TWO_LINE:
+          draw_line_total(sent, recv, y, x, OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_ONE_LINE_SENT, bytes);
+          draw_line_total(sent, recv, y+1, x, OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_ONE_LINE_RECV, bytes);
+        default:
+          return;
     }
-    if(linedisplay != OPTION_LINEDISPLAY_TWO_LINE) {
-        readable_size(n, buf, 10, 1024, bytes);
-        mvaddstr(y, x, buf);
-    }
+    readable_size(n, buf, 10, 1024, bytes);
+    mvaddstr(y, x, buf);
 }
 
 void draw_bar(float n, int y) {

--JwB53PgKC5A7+0Ej
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="iftop-0.16-alt-droproot.patch"

diff -uprk.orig iftop-0.16.orig/configure.in iftop-0.16/configure.in
--- iftop-0.16.orig/configure.in	2004-02-28 21:53:37 +0300
+++ iftop-0.16/configure.in	2004-03-31 14:51:09 +0400
@@ -53,6 +53,26 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libpcap,
     [libpcap_prefix=$withval],
     [libpcap_prefix=""])
 
+AC_ARG_WITH(user,
+    [  --with-user=USERNAME    Drop privileges by default to USERNAME])
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to drop root privileges by default])
+if test -n "$withval"; then
+    AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(WITH_USER, "$withval", [Drop privileges by default to this username])
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(to \"$withval\")
+else
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(chroot,
+    [  --with-chroot=DIRECTORY When dropping privileges, chroot to DIRECTORY])
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to chroot by default])
+if test -n "$withval"; then
+    AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(WITH_CHROOT, "$withval", [Chroot to this directory when dropping privileges])
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(to \"$withval\")
+else
+    AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+fi
+
 dnl
 dnl Fairly generic checks.
 dnl
diff -uprk.orig iftop-0.16.orig/iftop.c iftop-0.16/iftop.c
--- iftop-0.16.orig/iftop.c	2004-02-28 21:47:54 +0300
+++ iftop-0.16/iftop.c	2004-03-31 17:05:33 +0400
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
 
 #include "iftop.h"
 #include "addr_hash.h"
@@ -469,7 +472,6 @@ void packet_init() {
     }
     
     //    exit(0);
-    resolver_initialise();
 
     pd = pcap_open_live(options.interface, CAPTURE_LENGTH, options.promiscuous, 1000, errbuf);
     // DEBUG: pd = pcap_open_offline("tcpdump.out", errbuf);
@@ -516,10 +518,70 @@ void packet_loop(void* ptr) {
 }
 
 
+static int droproot (void) {
+	uid_t uid;
+	gid_t gid;
+
+	if (geteuid())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) {
+		perror ("setgroups");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if ((uid = getuid()) == 0) {
+#ifndef WITH_USER
+		return 0;
+#else /* WITH_USER */
+		const char *username = WITH_USER;
+		struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(username);
+
+		if (!pw) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lookup of user \"%s\" failed\n", username);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		gid = pw->pw_gid;
+		uid = pw->pw_uid;
+
+		if (uid == 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "user \"%s\" should not be privileged\n",
+				username);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		endpwent();
+
+#endif /* WITH_USER */
+	} else {
+		gid = getgid();
+	}
+		
+#ifdef WITH_CHROOT
+	{
+		const char *chroot_dir = WITH_CHROOT;
+		if (chroot(chroot_dir) < 0 || chdir ("/") < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "chroot/chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+				chroot_dir, strerror(errno));
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* WITH_CHROOT */
+
+	if (setgid(gid) < 0 || setuid(uid) < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "setuid/setgid to %u:%u failed: %s\n",
+			uid, gid, strerror(errno));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* main:
  * Entry point. See usage(). */
 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-    pthread_t thread;
+    int rc;
     struct sigaction sa = {};
 
     /* TODO: tidy this up */
@@ -534,21 +596,27 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     sa.sa_handler = finish;
     sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
 
-    pthread_mutex_init(&tick_mutex, NULL);
-
     packet_init();
 
     init_history();
 
     ui_init();
 
-    pthread_create(&thread, NULL, (void*)&packet_loop, NULL);
+    if ((rc = droproot()) == 0) {
+	pthread_t thread;
+
+	pthread_mutex_init(&tick_mutex, NULL);
 
-    ui_loop();
+	resolver_initialise();
 
-    pthread_cancel(thread);
+	pthread_create(&thread, NULL, (void*)&packet_loop, NULL);
+
+	ui_loop();
+
+	pthread_cancel(thread);
+    }
 
     ui_finish();
     
-    return 0;
+    return rc;
 }

--JwB53PgKC5A7+0Ej--


From pdw at ex-parrot.com  Wed Jan 20 16:59:38 2010
From: pdw at ex-parrot.com (Paul Warren)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 16:59:38 +0000
Subject: [Iftop-users] Security Issue With iftop
In-Reply-To: <20100120152124.GP19857@osdn.org.ua>
References: <fb6f4c5d1001180835y7fe21a80g172366548af37200@mail.gmail.com> <20100120140723.GN19857@osdn.org.ua> <20100120152124.GP19857@osdn.org.ua>
Message-ID: <2FBB0DF1-1EF3-4A58-B596-04D007393F44@ex-parrot.com>

On 20 Jan 2010, at 15:21, Michael Shigorin wrote:

> PreScriptum: Paul, could you please accept changes done here?
> http://git.altlinux.org/people/ldv/packages/?p=iftop.git

I need to review what has been done there, as those patches appear to  
tackle a range of different issues.

I would encourage you to submit patches directly to the list in  
future, as you write them, as it's much easier to discuss and accept  
them as they are written.

> I think that a privileged program shouldn't execute arbitrary user
> specified programs unless explicitly configured to allow such insecure
> behaviour.

iftop is not, by design, a privileged program.  There is nothing in  
the documentation that endorses running it setuid root, or in a sudo  
wrapper.  As such, the ability to get to a shell is no different from  
the fact that vim allows you to run arbitrary programs.

That said, the fact that iftop requires root privileges in order to  
run in the vast majority of environments means that a shell escape  
that is on by default may come as a nasty surprise to admins who use  
sudo / setuid root to grant access to iftop to semi-trusted users, and  
I would certainly consider making this an off-by-default compile time  
option.

Paul


From rob at hasselbaum.net  Fri Jan 22 00:33:39 2010
From: rob at hasselbaum.net (Rob Hasselbaum)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2010 19:33:39 -0500
Subject: [Iftop-users] iftop packet parsing code
Message-ID: <579e15a11001211633s3bc992b7ofee1638f765ff3c1@mail.gmail.com>

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Hello.

I'm working on a tool similar to iftop that will run as a KDE desktop
widget. I'm interested in incorporating some of the packet parsing code from
iftop, since it basically does what I need and I've been unable to find a
standalone library. So my questions are do you have any objections to this?
And if not, how would you like your work to be attributed? Note that I plan
to release the tool as GPL v3.

Thanks for your time,
-Rob

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Hello.<br><br>I&#39;m working on a tool similar to iftop that will run as a=
 KDE desktop widget. I&#39;m interested in incorporating some of the packet=
 parsing code from iftop, since it basically does what I need and I&#39;ve =
been unable to find a standalone library. So my questions are do you have a=
ny objections to this? And if not, how would you like your work to be attri=
buted? Note that I plan to release the tool as GPL v3.<br>
<br>Thanks for your time,<br>-Rob<br>

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